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     ABSTRACT 
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Supervisor: David J. Eaton 
 
The solar photovoltaic industry has many barriers to overcome before it can become a 
technically and economically competitive generation source including (1) lowering true 
generation costs, (2) decreasing reliance from government subsidies, and (3) developing a 
suitable energy storage solution.  Current unsubsidized costs of electricity from solar 
photovoltaic sources range from 24.0 to 58.3¢/kWh.  Subsidies bring the generation costs 
down to as low as 11¢/kWh, competitive with the average retail price of electricity in 
certain parts of the country.  Current subsidy policies used to encourage technology 
development may generate more profits rather than research and innovation.  The most 
optimistic predictions for solar photovoltaics include a convergence of a steep and 
prolonged rise in the cost of fossil-fuel based generation with a deep and prolonged 
decrease in the cost of photovoltaic generation by 2019.  Deviation from optimal 
conditions will prolong the delay the crossover until at least 2021 and possibly beyond 
2030.  The development of a solution to store excess electricity when the sun is available 
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PV: photovoltaic  
PPA: Power purchase agreement 
Kilowatt-hour (kWh): a measure of electricity defined as one kilowatt of power for a 
period of one hour  
Megawatt-hour (MWh): One thousand kilowatt-hours 
Levelized cost of energy (LCOE): the nominal cost of building and operating a 







Visions of cheap renewable energy are a common theme in fiction.  For example, John Galt 
produced an engine capable of using the static electricity in the ambient air as its main fuel source 
in Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged.  He created a machine that tapped an inexhaustible resource, 
which in turn could be used as the motor to drive cars, boats, and airplanes, create electricity, and 
ultimately drive economic development.  The cost of producing electricity from a power plant 
equipped with Galt’s technology was quite literally too cheap to meter.  Humans have a romantic 
ideal about deriving its energy supply from an infinite and clean fuel source, whether it is the sun, 
wind, ocean tides, or heat buried deep beneath the Earth’s surface.  The sun has been used for 
centuries to heat homes and water, provide energy for plants and, beginning in the 1950s, to 
generate electricity.  Electricity derived from solar energy has a number of benefits unavailable to 
fossil fuel generators.  Unlike coal, gas, or oil which produces damaging pollutants such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and particular matter (PM), a 
kilowatt-hour of electricity from solar power results in exactly zero emissions; it is pollution-free.  
Fossil fuels also need to be found and extracted while the sun is available everywhere and has 
zero associated exploration and production costs.  Since solar electricity production requires no 
fuel, it is shielded from fuel prices, which can be volatile.  The price per kilowatt-hour of 
electricity stays constant throughout its economic life, excluding maintenance and repairs.  It is 
said that the sun provides the Earth with more solar energy in one hour than human civilization 
uses in one year.  The sun packs an energy supply so abundant that we humans could never dream 
about exhausting the resource.  Society has since developed the technology to convert sunlight 
into electricity by using photovoltaic (PV) cells or creating steam from concentrated solar power 
(CSP) to drive turbines.  For all of its advantages, solar power has limits.  The sun is only 
available 40 percent of the time in sunnier locations.  Another problem with solar power today is 
that unlike Mr. Galt’s machine, our ability to harness the sun’s energy is not too cheap to meter 




This thesis analyzes the costs of solar power today and estimates how far solar technologies must 
advance in order to compete with the mix of electricity generators used today.  The results were 
obtained from both a literature review and an analytical model.  Among the topics explored are 
the issues of subsidies to the solar industry and externality costs resulting from fossil fuel 
generation.  This report analyzes the solar industry behind the exaggerations erected by pundits 
on either side of the subject to help guide the reader to answer the following question: will solar 
power ever become the dominant energy source or will it always be known as the energy source 




The basics of solar photovoltaics 
 
Two main types of solar energy are in development today.  Photovoltaic (PV) cells are a solid-
state generation platform with no moving parts that produces electricity using an electrochemical 
process.  The two kinds of PV cells are silicon based and thin film.  Silicon cells can reach a real-
life efficiency of about 16 percent while thin film cells have an efficiency of 10.6 percent at the 
moment (Stevenson, 2008).  Higher efficiencies translate into smaller cells, fewer raw materials, 
fewer engineering requirements, and cheaper overall systems.  Silicon cells are a very mature 
technology and have been in development for over 50 years, while thin film technologies have 
just recently reached the commercial phase. The technology is still in development and has room 
to improve to its theoretical maximum efficiency to 20 percent (Stevenson, 2008).   
The other type of solar power used commercially to generate electricity is concentrated solar 
power (CSP), which uses mirrors to focus sunlight onto a specific area.  The sunlight heats a fluid 
which is used to create steam and drive a turbine that generates electricity.  One example is the 
Solar Tres power tower will use molten salt as the heat transfer fluid which is heated to 1,050°F. 
The hot salt will be used to turn water into steam, which will drive a steam turbine.  The high heat 
capacity of the salt allows generation for up to 15 hours when there is no sunlight available 
(Martin, 2007).  The other CSP technology currently in operation is the parabolic trough.  Several 
other technologies are in development phase, but are not yet available on a commercial scale.  
Several CSP demonstration plants totaling over 350 MW were built between 1984 and 1990 in 
California.  The original project sponsor, Luz International, went bankrupt in 1991, but these 
power plants continued to operate (Smil, 2005).   
Solar generation capacity today consists mostly of silicon PV (92%).  The solar power industry 
has recently experienced tremendous growth in PV capacity, averaging an annual growth rate of 
nearly 32 percent since 1998 and increasing over 15 times in size (see Figure 1) (EPIA, 2008).  




current cost of silicon cells average $4.74 per Watt (W) not including installation costs, but price 
per Watt fluctuates between $4.65 and $4.90 from 2005 to 2009 (see Figure 2).   
Figure 1.  Cumulative global PV capacity (1994-2007) 
 
 
EPIA, 2008.  Global Outlook for Photovoltaics until 2012: Facing a Sunny Future. Report, 






Figure 2.  Solar module prices from 2005-2009 
 
 
Solarbuzz, 2009.  “Solar module retail price environment.  Available: 
http://www.solarbuzz.com/ModulePrices.htm 
 
The general trend of decreasing panel prices from 2001 to 2004 ended because of the increasing 
demand for solar panels.  Higher demand has increased raw material and solar panel pricing since 
2004.  One of the key raw materials is polysilicon.  Spot market prices of polysilicon rose from 
$30/kg to over $400/kg between 2004 and 2008.  Long-term contract prices for 2008, however, 




Figure 3.  Long-term polysilicon contract price projection (2008-2015) 
 
 
New Energy Finance, 2009.  Presentation, New Energy Finance Global Insight Overview, China, 
March 19 
 
Only 7 firms worldwide supplied the bulk of the polysilicon in 2007 (Arnoldy, 2008).  Although 
silicon is one of the most abundant elements on Earth and used widely in the semiconductor 
industry, solar cells demand a higher quality of polysilicon.  Solar cells require “6N” pure silicon 
which is 99.9999 (six nines) percent pure (Flynn, 2006).   
Between 9-12 grams of polysilicon are consumed per Watt manufactured (Flynn, 2006; New 
Energy Finance, 2008; Swanson, 2007).  Every dollar that polysilicon prices increases roughly 
equates to a 1¢/W increase in manufacturing costs.  With the technology and manufacturing 
available today, a polysilicon cost of $30-165/kg can represent a cost of $0.27-$2.00 per Watt 
manufactured.  Several new polysilicon supplies have come online in 2009, leading to lower 




2006 production levels by the end of 2009, easing the current polysilicon shortage, and 
potentially dropping the price of polysilicon significantly (Arnoldy, 2008).   
Non-silicon based PV manufacturers such as First Solar were not affected by this shortage.  First 
Solar uses a cadmium telluride (CdTe) based thin film cell.  Cadmium is a common byproduct of 
mining, so it is an available resource. Tellurium is costlier, but the amount of material deposited 
on thin film cells are only microns thick, lowering raw material costs.  The company had a 
manufacturing cost of $1.14 per Watt in 2008 which it expects to lower to $0.70 per Watt by 
2020 (Stevenson, 2008).  Thin film panels are significantly cheaper to manufacture than silicon-
based PV, but the efficiency of thin-film panels are also lower.  The lower efficiency translates 
into larger installation areas for thin-film panels, resulting in higher installation and property 
costs.  Thin-film technology is also less mature and less competitive than silicon PV, with one 
firm largely dominating the thin-film market.  
Panel costs only contribute to a portion of photovoltaic systems.  The other cost components 
include site assessment, site engineering, installation, grid hook-up, and inverter costs which 
account for at least 40 percent of the total system cost.  An inverter is required to covert the DC 
power generated by PV panels to the AC power that comes out of wall outlets.  Inverters cost 
about 70¢ per continuous Watt of capacity (Solar Buzz, 2008).  Aside from high capital 
expenditures, solar panels have low operational costs.  There are no fuel costs and maintenance 
costs can be negligible.  Several utility scale PV installations in Arizona surveyed over a 3 year 
period and found that maintenance costs averaged 0.16 percent of the original capital investment 
(Sandia, 2005).  A PV system with capital costs of $7,000/kW then has annual fixed costs of 




Modeling solar energy costs 
 
One barrier to determining the current costs of solar power was that the data available were not 
necessarily reliable.  One solar projection published by NASA and the DOE appeared to be too 
optimistic (see Figure 4).   
Figure 4.  Solar energy cost competitive projections 
 
Bradford, T., 2006.  Solar revolution: the economic transformation of the global energy industry.  
MIT Press.  Cambridge, Massachussets 
 
This graph indicates that PV is cost competitive at $6/W in Los Angeles with a LCOE of slightly 
more than 12¢/kWh.  A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation demonstrates that these isocurve 
projections cannot be correct.  A 1 kW array at $6/W has a total cost of $6,000.  Los Angeles 
receives 2,000 hours of sunlight per year, producing 60,000 kWh of electricity over a 30 year 
period.  Assuming that the system incurs no further costs, dividing total costs by total electricity 
production reveals a LCOE of 10¢/kWh.  The calculation underestimates the true LCOE, since it 




taxes, operation, and maintenance.  A rudimentary discounted cash flow using a nominal 2 
percent discount rate, less than the historical rate of inflation, raises the LCOE to 13.1¢/kWh 
(Financial Trend Forecaster, 2009).  How much more would the LCOE increase once the other 
fiscal terms were included?  The unrealistically optimistic projections currently published 
prompted the author to develop a model that projected more realistic end-generation costs.   
An analytical Excel-based analytical model was developed to determine the current costs of solar 
power today and to “back into” data when there were gaps.  The model predicted solar energy 
costs based on input data such as capital, operating, and maintenance costs, as well as capacity 
factor.  The methodology used was based on the assumption that every technology has a set of 
unique parameters.  For example, a PV system in Los Angeles, CA operates at peak capacity for 
about 2000 hours per year, about a 23 percent capacity factor (Solar Buzz, 2009).  PV systems 
should therefore not operate at significantly greater capacity factors than 23 percent.  The final 
results were used to determine whether the cost or performance estimates were both technically 
feasible and in-line with the rest of the industry.  One of the difficulties encountered with the 
model was actually compiling a complete dataset including all relevant cost and performance data 
regarding a particular project.  Data were scarce or not provided by a reliable source, resulting in 
many incomplete data sets.  For example, companies were willing to provide the end-cost of 
electricity generation without providing any input data.  One example is the claim that Sunrgi has 
the technology to produce electricity for 5.0¢/kWh (Sunrgi, 2009).  The model was able to 
interpolate the capital cost of the project within a reasonable margin of error.   
Sunrgi claims that its system produces about 175 percent of the electricity of a standard fixed PV 
system of the same nameplate capacity.  One of the assumptions was that the system would be 
placed in a sunny area, such as Los Angeles, raising the capacity factor from 23 percent to about 
40 percent (Sunrgi, 2008).  The model calculated that the total system costs need to be below 
$2,500/kW to produce electricity at 5.0¢/kWh.  The same methodology was used to determine the 
costs of a similar CPV system installed by SolFocus, a direct competitor of Sunrgi, of 
$10,000/kW (Cheyney, 2009).  Sunrgi’s prediction that it can install a similar solar generation 
station at just 25 percent of the cost of SolFocus warrants deeper analysis into the difference 




The model also serves a dual-purpose; it ensures a fair, apples-to-apples comparison between the 
competing technologies and projects.  While some parameters were unique to each project (such 
as capacity factor, heat rate, variable costs, or fixed costs), others parameters were held constant 
throughout the analysis, except for residential solar systems which were given tax rates of 0 
percent (see Table 1).   
Table 1.  Assumptions used in the LCOE model 
Discount rate 10% Loan period 15 
years 
Interest rate 5% Tax rate 30% 
Inflation rate 3% Debt fraction 80% 
 
The capital cost, operating expenses, and capacity factor of each technology is unique to each 
project.  Fiscal terms were held constant since adjusting the discount, interest, and tax rate, can 
severely affect its valuation.  Table 2 compares the generation cost of the same project under 
different financing structures.   
Table 2.  The effect of altering project financing structures on electricity generation costs 
Conergy SinAn Project Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Debt fraction 50% 80% 
IRR 10% 10% 
LCOE 48.2¢/kWh 42.7¢/kWh 
Difference 5.5¢/kWh (12.8%) 
 
The Conergy SinAn project at 50 percent debt financing and an internal rate of return (IRR) of 10 
percent has a LCOE of 48.2¢/kWh.  Changing the debt financing to 80 percent lowers the LCOE 
to 42.7¢/kWh, a rather significant difference of 5.5¢/kWh (12.8%).  The comparison was 
performed to demonstrate that project economics can be manipulated by changing fiscal terms.  
To conduct a fair cost comparison across different projects and technologies, an analyst should 
use common assumptions to assess each project.  The model used herein uses a consistent 




the model will similarly undervalue a fossil fuel generator.  A survey detailing the parameters of 
12 power plants was completed to roughly compare the costs of generation from various sources 
(see Table 3).   
Table 3.  Survey of capital costs and LCOE of various power projects 







Solar Garden Silicon PV 9.55 2007 8,848 58.4
SinAn Silicon PV 19.6 2008 5,969 38.1
SkyPower Thin film 19 N/A 4,189 45.1
Rote Jahne Thin film 6 2007 4,667 49.8
SolFocus CPV 10 2008 10,000 24
Austin home PV 0.036 2009 8,000 48.2
Generic SCGT 100 N/A 421 14.1
Generic CCGT 100 N/A 621 5.3
Generic Coal 800 N/A 2,058 4.9
 
For sources, see Appendix A 
The survey of solar projects revealed levelized costs from 24.0 to 58.4¢/kWh.  The residential 
retail rate of electricity from Austin Energy today is 6-11¢/kWh.  The average cost of electricity 
in California, which has a reputation for high electricity costs, is 12.8¢/kWh (Austin Energy, 
2008; EIA, 2009). Solar electricity costs between 2 and 10 times as much as electricity from the 
grid.  The model projects that installed costs of PV systems must drop to about $2 per Watt 




Figure 5.  Variation of the levelized cost of solar power at various installed costs 
 
 
The price projections are based on a 20 percent capacity factor which can be achieved in areas 
with dense solar resources such as Southern California or West Texas.  Within the continental 48 
states, California is most likely to reach cost competitiveness first because it has high quality 
solar resources and among the highest average retail electricity rates of 12.82¢/kWh (EIA, 2009).  
At the rates today, the costs of solar panels would need to drop 70 percent to $1,500/kW to reach 
cost competitiveness.  Martin Green of the University of New South Wales predicts that the lower 
limit of silicon PV modules is $2,000/kW, making a system cost of $1,500/kW unattainable 
(Bradford, 2006).  Notice that even with zero installed costs the LCOE is still 3.9¢/kWh.  This 
cost is due to labor and maintenance.  Inverters require replacement every 5-10 years (Bradford, 
2006).  The replacement cost of a 3 kW residential-size inverter would likely be close to $2,400.   
Solar PV can also be installed as a distributed generator, meaning that its electricity is used at the 
point of generation.  The benefit of distributed generation is that the electricity does not need to 
be transported to the end-user, eliminating transmission and distribution costs.  Utility-scale 




simply not enough space available in populated areas to install large solar arrays, thus, the 
electricity will incur transmission and distribution costs.  The main problem is that small scale 
distributed generation is more expensive than utility-scale applications.  The average residential 
PV array in Austin averaged $8.80/W in 2007, while the cost of some utility-scale projects were 
as low as $4.20/W.  Utility-scale projects can benefit from economies of scale, simplifying the 
engineering requirements of the installation site.  Distributed rooftop generation, however, cannot 
achieve these cost savings, as each individual site has different solar resources depending on its 
orientation and shading, different roofing material, etc.  Ultimately, each site must be assessed 
individually, leading to higher installation costs.   
A Texas household that used 1,000 kilowatt-hours (1 megawatt-hour) had an electricity bill of 
$99-269 in June 2008 (Austin Energy, 2008).  If the same household received all of electricity 
from solar PV instead, the electric bill would have cost $240-580.  Despite its lack of cost 
competitiveness at the moment, solar power continues to grow at a very aggressive rate on a 
utility and residential scale.  
 For the lack of available data on PV systems, the data for CSP generators is even scarcer.  A 
study commissioned by NREL in 2003 projected that CSP technologies produce electricity at a 
cost of 9.9-12¢/kWh by 2004 and decreasing to 5.7-9.9¢/kWh in 2010 (NREL, 2003).  The solar 
industry’s lobbying group in the U.S., the Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA) claimed in 
2007 that CSP production costs were 10-14¢/kWh (SEIA, 2007).  The average wholesale 
electricity price in Texas’ Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and California markets 
were 6.34¢/kWh and 8.12¢/kWh, respectively, in 2008 (EIA, 2009).  If solar generation 
technologies can supply electricity for less than the average wholesale price in several markets, 
economics dictates that solar power should be deployed on a rather large scale.  Instead, solar 
capacity worldwide is less than 15,000MW, about half of Texas’ peak summertime electricity 
demand.  Electricity from solar generators is responsible for less than 1 percent of total generation 
in the U.S. and even less from CSP generators.  The lack of current and reliable cost and 




The possibility of solar power becoming more economically viable due to rising costs of fossil 
fuel generation is explored later on in the thesis.  The role of subsidies in this expansion is 




The role of subsidies 
 
Technologies that are deployed on a wide scale can achieve lower costs as technology advances, 
past experiences provide valuable lessons, and economies of scale are reached.  Bruce Henderson 
of the Boston Consulting Group observed in several industries in 1960 that production costs 
declined as cumulative production increased.  The concept of the experience curve was born.  The 
solar industry uses the experience curve as the basis of many future cost projections.  Two of the 
most widely known experience curve projections were made by Paul Maycock in 2002 and 
Strategies Unlimited in 2003 (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6.  Learning curve estimates provided by Maycock (2002) and Strategies Unlimited (2003).  
 
Nemet, G.F., 2006. Beyond the learning curve: factors influencing the cost reduction in 
photovoltaics. Energy Policy 34(2006), 3218-3232 
 
One of the main principles behind subsidizing the solar market is to accelerate cumulative 
production so solar technology advances along the experience curve more quickly.  Using the 
experience curve to predict the rate at which production costs decline is not a perfect method.  
The quality of the learning curve may reflect the historical data used to plot the curve, but there is 




Particularly when cost reductions are graphed on a log-linear scale, the projections must assume 
very rapid cost reductions.   
Both Maycock and Strategies Unlimited predicted learning ratios for solar power and produced 
two different results; Maycock determined a ratio of 0.26 and Strategies Unlimited a ratio of 0.17.  
The learning ratio is used to represent the percentage that production costs decline with every 
doubling of cumulative production.  For example, if solar panels cost $50/W at a cumulative 
capacity of 1 MW, the costs would decline to $41.50/W when cumulative capacity reached 2 
MW.  Higher learning ratios result in more aggressive cost declines.  Consider how long it would 
take for solar power to cross the $0.30/W threshold using the two different learning ratios at a 
constant annual growth rate of 15 percent.  Maycock’s learning ratio of 0.26 reveals that solar 
panels should reach the threshold in 2039 while the Strategies Unlimited ratio predicts 2067 
(Nemet, 2006).  The experience curve also unrealistically assumes that cost reductions continue 
indefinitely.  Production will eventually reach a lower limit as raw materials and labor have 
associated costs.  It can be agreed upon by all that the solar industry has not yet hit that lower 
limit, but it makes a great difference whether the threshold is $2/W as predicted by Green or 
$0.25/W.  Despite the limitations associated with using the experience curve, this is the method 
used in this thesis to predict future prices for several reasons.  First, it appears to be a method 
accepted by the solar industry.  Richard Swanson, founder and president of solar manufacturer 
SunPower, uses this method himself in making projections of the solar industry (Swanson, 2007).  
And second, the experience curve is a straightforward and simple method that has generally 
correlated well to the actual cost evolution of declining production costs (Nemet, 2006).   
The installation of new solar generation capacity has recently been dominated by relatively few 
markets (see Figure 7).  Japan was the market leader from the late 1990s until 2002, when it 
subsidized about 50 percent of the initial cost of a solar system.  Japan gradually decreased its 
subsidies to 7 percent.  By 2004 Germany became the new market leader.  There is no doubt that 
subsidies have succeeded in increasing demand for solar energy.  New solar installations grew by 
25 percent in 2000, 38 percent in 2004, and 59 percent in 2008.  Germany created one of the most 
successful policies to encourage development of the solar industry: the feed-in tariff (FiT).  FiTs 




between 45.5 and 61.1¢/kWh for a set period of time, usually 20-25 years (EPIA, 2009).  Many 
credit the massive expansion of solar power to FiTs, which “have been responsible for the 
whopping growth of the PV industry in several European countries,” along several other countries 
worldwide (Solar America Cities, 2008).  The cost of the FiTs in Germany, however, are passed 
along to the ratepayers by the utility companies.  As the share of solar generated electricity grew, 
so did the ultimate cost of the FiT.  Its cost more than quintupled from €0.00087/kWh in 1998 to 
€0.0051/kWh in 2004 (Growitsch, 2005).  The FiT currently adds about $1.60 onto the monthly 
electricity bill for German ratepayers (EPIA, 2009).  Several other countries have adopted FiT 
policies, which contributed to the recent high growth in the industry.  Spain grew from just a 
niche market in 2005, installing only 26 MW to the world leader in 2008 when over 2,500 MW 
was installed.  The nations with the most generous subsidy policies generally experience the most 
growth (Figure 8).   
Figure 7.  New solar capacity by region (1998-2008) 
 
 
EPIA, 2009.  Global outlook for photovoltaics until 2013: Facing a Sunny Future. Report, 










EPIA, 2008.  Overview of European PV support schemes.  Report, European Photovoltaic 
Industry Association, December 17 
 
Many nations now subsidize their solar industry, with some nations agreeing to pay upwards of 
60¢/kWh of solar electricity for the next 2 decades.  One can look towards the American wind 
industry to observe the role of subsidies on developing energy technologies.  Instead of the ITC, 
the wind industry is given a production tax credit (PTC) of 1.9¢ for every kilowatt-hour generated 
(AWEA, 2009).  The PTC expired in 1999, 2001, and 2003 before it was renewed by Congress.  
Expiration of the PTC was followed by a sharp decline in wind capacity additions the following 




Figure 9.  Annual wind installed wind capacity (1996-2008) 
 
 
AWEA, 2009. Annual wind industry report 2008.  Report, American Wind Energy Association.  
Available: http://www.awea.org/publications/reports/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.pdf 
 
Following their wind counterparts, solar project developers are not installing capacity in the 
locations with the highest quality solar resources.  There are far sunnier locations worldwide than 
Germany and Japan.  Instead, the solar industry follows the subsidies.  The Japanese solar market 
has “scarcely grown at all, or has even shrunk, since the national subsidies program ended,” 
further reinforcing the fact that the solar industry is subsidy-dependent (Koot, 2008).  
While subsidies have introduced additional renewable energy to the electricity market, the 
consequences of this economic distortion are not necessarily all positive.  Tax and ratepayers are 
those responsible for paying for the more expensive generation sources.  One particularly 
perverse consequence occurs in Texas during certain periods of the year when more wind energy 
is produced than the grid can absorb.  Transmission lines become clogged and wholesale 




power is literally worth less than nothing; wind producers must pay customers to accept its 
electricity (Combs, 2008).  Producers are willing to take losses on their electricity sales because 
the PTC is only received if electricity is delivered.  Since wind energy has no marginal costs of 
production, the transaction is revenue positive as long as the sale price is above -1.9¢/kWh.  It is 
even possible that such a transaction results in a double bonus for the wind producer: the sale is 
claimed at a loss in addition to the 1.9¢ in tax credits received.  The beneficiaries are the wind 
producer and offtaker.  Taxpayers, on the other hand, are subsidizing these kinds of transactions.  
The electricity supplied is not demanded or wanted by the market and it has a negative value.  
This particular example is a case where subsidy policies were not well executed and represent a 
tragedy of the commons when few parties benefit at the expense of many.   
The solar industry does not escape from this fallacy of subsidies.  In fact, all energy sources are 
subsidized to an extent.  How do the subsidies of the solar industry compare with those received 
by conventional fossil fuel based generators?  In absolute terms, the coal, natural gas, and nuclear 
industries receive much greater subsidies than the solar industry (see Table 4).    
Table 4.  2007 electricity production subsidies. 





(billion-kWh) ($million) (¢/kWh) 
Coal 1,946 854 0.044
Natural gas 919 227 0.025
Nuclear 794 1,267 0.159
Solar 1 14 2.43
Wind 31 724 2.37
 
EIA, 2007.  Federal financial interventions and subsidies in energy markets: 2007.  Report, U.S. 
Energy Information Administration.   
The nuclear industry received nearly $1.3 billion in support in 2007, compared to 14 million by 
the solar industry.  Solar generators however produced just 0.05 percent of the electricity of its 
coal counterparts and 0.12 percent of the electricity produced by nuclear in 2007.  Once data are 
aggregated in terms of support per kilowatt-hour generated, solar energy disproportionately 




electricity produced than nuclear power, which is commonly displayed as the poster child of 
energy subsidies.  Table 4, however, only reflects subsidies given by the federal government and 
ignores support from state and local governments.  Austin Energy, for example, offers a solar 
rebate of $3.75/W (maximum of $13,500) which pays up to 53 percent of a solar installation 
assuming system costs of $8/W (see Table 5).   
The main federal policy supporting solar energy is the Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which 
rebated 30 percent and a maximum of $2,000 of the initial cost of residential and commercial 
solar installations until October 2008.  A revised ITC was implemented in October 2008 which 
also allowed access to the ITC by utility companies and removed the $2,000 rebate limit (SEIA, 
2008).  Subsidies given out in 2009 will reflect new ITC policy and will probably significantly 
raise the amount of support received by the solar industry.  Table 5 illustrates the effect of various 
subsidy policies on the cost of solar power.   
Table 5. Comparison of residential Austin PV levelized costs under varying subsidy regimes 
($8.00 per installed Watt, 3.6 kW system, 20 percent capacity factor) 
Subsidy type Subsidy Subsidy LCOE System cost Difference 
  ($) ($/kWh) (¢/kWh) ($/W) (%) 
Unsubsidized N/A N/A 39.8 8 0 
30% ITC, $2,000 limit 2,000 2.6 37.2 7.44 7 
30% ITC, no limit 8,640 11.2 28.6 5.6 30 
Austin Energy $3.75/W, 
$13,500 max. 
13,500 17.5 22.3 4.25 47 
Combined ITC and AE 
rebate 
22,140 28.7 11.1 1.85 77 
 
Removal of the $2,000 limit on the ITC adds an additional $6,640 (332%) of support for this 
particular installation.  Combining Austin Energy’s solar rebate with the new ITC offered by the 
federal government subsidizes 28.7¢/kWh (72%) of the cost of solar electricity and results in a 
LCOE of 11.1¢/kWh.  The subsidized cost of solar electricity is still only marginally competitive 




Analysis of the subsidies given to the fossil fuel generation industry was also performed.  Burning 
fossil fuel generates harmful pollutants such as carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate 
matter.  Generators are legally permitted to emit certain amounts of these pollutants that are 
known to cause harm to human health or the environment without financial penalty.  The 
damages caused by these pollutants may include respiratory diseases to humans, damage to 
ecosystems, climate change and other environmental consequences.  Ultimately, fossil fuel 
generators do not pay for most of these costs.  These “hidden” subsidies are instead paid for by 
taxpayers.  A methodology to quantify pollution costs from electricity generation sources was 
created by the European Commission’s Externalities of Energy (ExternE) research project (see 
Table 6).   
Table 6.  Estimates of the cost of pollution 
¢/kWh Coal Gas Solar PV 
Damage 0.98-1.71 0.01-.0.46 0.6
Avoidance 2.23-2.34 1.00-1.01 0.48
Total 3.21-4.05 1.01-1.47 1.08
 
Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority.  2006.  Governor’s energy policy council staff 
research brief: full cost accounting.  Atlanta, Georgia.  Available: 
http://www.gefa.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=37 
 
Health care and direct environmental damage are both classified as damage costs.  Avoidance 
costs consist mostly of carbon dioxide mitigation.  Friedrich and Bickel priced CO2 around 
$21/ton in 2008 dollars.  That cost may or may not represent the true cost of the impacts resulting 
from CO2 emissions, but is debatable.  An additional $220/ton CO2 would need to be levied onto 
coal generation in order to match the 28.7¢/kWh subsidy that solar energy receives in Austin, TX.  
The breakeven carbon price for a SCGT is even greater since natural gas has a lower carbon 
content; the price would need to exceed $400/ton CO2 to match the subsidy received by solar 





A Greenpeace study that estimated the cost of coal fired generation at 160-240 RMB per ton of 
coal excluding the cost of climate change.   Assuming an exchange rate of 7 RMB to the US 
dollar, the cost of coal increases by $1.20-1.79 per MMBtu (Katzer, 2007 and Yushi, 2008).  
Generation costs increase by 1.2-1.8¢/kWh which represents about 6 percent of the subsidy 
received by solar energy.  While these costs may not necessarily represent the true costs of coal 
generation, the figures are in-line with the studies published by the Georgia Environmental 
Facilities Authority and Friedrich.   
Classifying pollution costs as “hidden” subsidies results in average total subsidies of 1.27¢/kWh 
for natural gas and 3.67¢/kWh for coal power.  The true unsubsidized cost of coal power then 
becomes 8.57¢/kWh, still less than solar power subsidies, which costs 23.4-58.4¢/kWh.   
End-consumer costs for PV systems are at its lowest points historically, but actual module costs 
have been increasing since 2004.  The prices of polysilicon and solar modules should be 
declining, not rising according to the experience curve.  The unintended consequences of driving 
demand include a shortage of raw materials, resulting in higher feedstock and end-product prices.  
The current cost of solar modules has significantly deviated from the experience curve projected 
by Maycock (see Figure 10).  The demand for solar modules and polysilicon is artificial, driven at 
least in part by generous government subsidies.  Since subsidized consumer costs continue to 
decrease despite increasing unsubsidized costs, suppliers can raise prices without affecting their 




Figure 10.  Current PV module pricing versus experience curve projections 
 
 
Henderson, R.M., Conkling, J., Roberts, S., 2007.  Sunpower: focused on the future of solar 






Figure 11. Earnings margins by position in the value chain (third quarter 2008) 
 
New Energy Finance, 2009.  Presentation, New Energy Finance Global Insight Overview, China, 
March 19 
 
An argument can be made that the generous subsidies exacerbated or even created the current 
polysilicon shortage and high module prices.  Total PV generation capacity nearly quadrupled 
since 2004, the year when the polysilicon prices began to rise.  Polysilicon and other suppliers 
along the value chain benefitted from the windfall as polysilicon spot prices rose from $30/kg to 
$450/kg in 2004-2008.  Earnings margins in excess of 45 percent were experienced by 
polysilicon producers during the third quarter of 2008.  The profits earned by these private 
enterprises were subsidized by tax and ratepayers – yet another example of a tragedy of the 
commons.  
The price of solar modules has deviated from Maycock’s experience curve and prices have 




experience curve projected the cost of solar modules should have reach $1.30/W at a cumulative 
solar PV capacity of 10,000 MW, which was reached in 2008; module prices averaged $4.80/W 
in the first 4 months of 2009 (Henderson, 2007).  Polysilicon prices, however, are projected to 
remain above $60/kg until 2015.  Furthermore, there are no guarantees that raw material prices 
will ever retreat back to $30/kg.   
The solar industry is predicted to grow an annual rate of 30 percent until 2020 (Bradford, 2006).  
If the industry is to keep up a 30 percent constant growth rate, an enormous amount of polysilicon 
and module production capacity will need to come online.  PV capacity will increase 20 times its 
current size in the next 11 years at an estimated cost of over $1 trillion.  
Demand can also be driven by non-financial policies.  PG&E of California recently signed three 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) totaling 560 MW of solar energy (PG&E, 2007).  There are 
few reasons why PG&E would enter into contracts that raises retail rates for its consumers but 
does not provide any real cost-reduction benefits.  One reason is that California has a renewable 
portfolio standard that requires each utility company source 20 percent of its electricity from 
renewable resources by 2010 (Henderson, 2007).  Renewable energy portfolios (RPS) or 
renewable energy standards (RES) are individual state policies that require certain amount of 




Table 7.  Individual state renewable portfolio standards 
State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards Renewable target Year 
Arizona  15% 2025 
California  20% 2010 
Colorado  20% 2020 
Connecticut  10% 2010 
Delaware  10% 2019 
Hawaii  20% 2020 
Illinois  8% 2013 
Iowa  105 MW   
Maine  20% 2000 
Maryland  
9.5 (2% from 
solar) 2022 
Massachusetts  4% new 2009 
Montana  15% 2015 
Nevada  20% 2015 
New Hampshire  25% 2025 
New Jersey  20% 2020 
New Mexico  20% 2020 
New York  25% 2013 
Oregon  25% 2025 
Pennsylvania  18% 2020 
Rode Island  16% 2020 
Texas  5,880 MW 2015 
Vermont  




Washington  15% 2020 
Washington D.C.  11% 2022 
Wisconsin  10% 2015 
 
Henderson, R.M., Conkling, J., Roberts, S., 2007.  Sunpower: focused on the future of solar 




Political mandates may not themselves demand government expenditures, but they can inflate the 




solar development.  “Without a solar carve-out, any RES becomes a mandate for wind and 
biomass only,” since utility companies will pick the lowest cost generators available which 
generally does not include solar power (SEIA, 2008).   
The ultimate problem of subsidies is that they are designed to provide the most support to those 
that need the most help.  The policy is equivalent to a teacher giving a failing student the highest 
marks because s/he would otherwise fail out of school.  The subsidy policies today are based on 
quantity; those that sell the most products receive the most subsidies.  These do not necessarily 
encourage companies to develop a better product.  Of the previous 16 innovations that led to 
significant decreases in manufacturing costs, only 6 were discovered by the solar industry.  The 
rest were either discovered in research and development labs or adopted from other industries.  
The wire-saws used to slice silicon ingots into wafers, for example, were invented by the tire 
industry (Nemet, 2006).  Innovative companies such as First Solar had earnings margins of 40 
percent, doubling the margins of its competitors in Q3 2008.  Subsidies should not allow 
companies that use outdated and otherwise uncompetitive technology to remain profitable.  
Research and development is inherently a risky venture, as the money invested may not 
necessarily yield positive returns. Support instead could be given in the form of research and 
development to innovative companies that have a track record of advancing photovoltaic 
technology.  If the subsidy policies remain, there are public policy reasons why they should be 




The future of solar power 
 
Solar industry analyst Travis Bradford, founder of the Promethus Institute, predicts that grid 
parity will be reached in markets with high quality solar resources within the next decade (Hard 
Assets Investor, 2008).  Solar module costs have fallen significantly in the past decade and an 
increased supply of polysilicon will certainly help drive costs down.  On the other hand, the solar 
industry has a history of optimistic predictions.  The now defunct Chronar Corporation predicted 
in 1989 that it would be able to reduce the installed costs of a PV system to $2.50/W, thus 
lowering generation costs to 7-12¢/kWh by 1992 (Moore, 1989).  Sunrgi of California predicts it 
will be able to supply electricity at a retail price of 5¢/kWh by late 2009, despite it not having 
commercially produced a single kilowatt-hour of electricity (Sunrgi, 2009).  Solar generation 
technologies have been around for over 50 years and considerable investments were made in the 
technology in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  Significant growth has only been achieved in the last 
few years, for which subsidies are largely responsible.  The unsubsidized cost of solar generators 
today is still prohibitively expensive, with an installed cost of about $8,000/kW for residential 
and greater than $4,500/kW for most utility scale systems.  This section analyzes whether solar 
energy will go the way of the semiconductor – achieve success beyond any expectations – or if it 
will follow the path of oil shale and synthetic fuels, and become a technology of failed potential.   
Defining grid parity 
 
The holy grail of solar power is the point of grid parity: when the cost per kWh of delivered solar 
electricity equals the cost of power from the grid.  When grid parity occurs will the result be 
widespread deployment of solar power and a phasing out of conventional power?  The question is 
difficult to answer since grid prices are dynamic and different power sources produce electricity 
under different conditions which produce base, intermediate, and peak power.  Distributed PV 
generation systems will reach grid parity, as defended in this thesis, when the average peak 




remote locations so additional costs associated with transmission and distribution will delay grid 
parity.  The following two sections delve deeper into explaining this position.  
Electricity from natural gas generation usually costs more than electricity from coal generation.  
The two power plants also serve different functions which can allow a more expensive natural gas 
generation to have a higher value than coal.  The value of kilowatt-hour available now is not 
necessarily worth the same as a kilowatt-hour available later.  Like any other commodity, the 
value of electricity is determined by its level of supply and demand.  For example, while the 
wholesale price of peak electricity in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market 
ranged from $4-10/MWh on April 15, 2008, the value of electricity on June 13, 2008 ranged from 
$140-143/MWh.  The overall the market fluctuated between $4-143/MWh, with an average price 
of $63.41/MWh in 2008 (Figure 12) (EIA, 2009b).   
Figure 12.  ERCOT daily high traded wholesale electricity prices in 2008 
 
 
EIA, 2009. Wholesale market data.  Report, U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 22. 





The answer to why natural gas generated electricity can receive a price premium over coal 
generated electricity is explored from the point of view of an independent power producer (IPP) 
serving a simple wholesale market.  This scenario assumes that the market is perfectly 
competitive and no single entity has the ability to influence the market price of electricity.  It also 
assumes that all power generated is sold on the open market, not through PPAs.  This 
hypothetical IPP has a portfolio containing a coal, simple cycle gas turbine, and PV solar power 
plants (see Table 8). 
Table 8.  Cost comparison of different generation technologies 





2,058 634 5,021 
Fixed  
($/kW-year) 
27.53 10.53 11.68 
Marginal  
(¢/kWh) 
1.98 7.2 0 
 
EIA, 2009.  Electric power industry: 2007 year in review.  Report, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html#one 
 
The cost structure of a power plant is made up of capital, fixed, and variable costs.  The cost to 
build the power plant is represented by capital expenditures.  Fixed costs are the necessary 
support needed to operate the power plant such as labor and insurance.  Together, these costs are 
sunk and must be spent regardless of whether the plant generates 1 kilowatt-hour or 1 gigawatt-
hour of electricity.  The cost to produce every additional kilowatt-hour of electricity is its 
marginal cost.   
Coal power plants are generally very large, with high capital expenditures, high fixed costs, low 
variable costs, and low fuel costs.  Coal plants generally have high capacity factors, averaging 




electricity produced by a coal plant built today would be 1.98¢/kWh.  Coal power plants can be 
responsive to operator input, but varying burn rates can lead to slag build up in the boilers.  Coal 
power plants usually profit by selling large quantities of electricity at low profit margins.   
A simple cycle gas turbine (SCGT) has distinct characteristics different from a coal plant, with 
SCGTs have low capital costs, low fixed costs, high variable costs, and high marginal costs.  The 
operating characteristics of SCGTs make them very responsive to operator input.  An operator 
can ramp up from a minimum to full production in as little as 15 minutes (Austin Energy, 2008).  
Because of its high variable cost, SCGTs are used sparingly, with an overall capacity factor of 
11.4 percent in the U.S. in 2007 (EIA, 2009).  A SCGT constructed today would have marginal 
costs of 7.2¢/kWh.   The profit maximizing scheme therefore directs the IPP to wait until the 
market price of electricity exceeds the marginal cost of production from the SCGT.  One feature 
of the wholesale market is that it features both real-time and forward trading.  Trades can be 
executed immediately, hours-ahead, days-ahead, or weeks-ahead of the actual delivery time.  
Versatile dispatchable generation sources such as SCGTs or combined-cycle gas turbines 
(CCGT) have the option to enter into these types of trades to lock in prices and provide a set 
amount of generation for a future time.     
Solar power plants have very high capital costs, low fixed costs, and zero variable and marginal 
costs.  One feature that sets solar generation apart from coal or gas generation is that it is not 
dispatchable; the operator has no control over its electricity production.  Solar power is inherently 
intermittent by nature.  Its electrical output changes depending on the intensity of the sun.  If the 
IPP builds a solar plant in Los Angeles, it expects that the plant will operate at peak production 
for approximately 2,000 hours per year (Solar Buzz, 2009).  The IPP, however, does not know 
whether it will be producing power at noon on August 15, 2009.  How, then, will the IPP behave?  
On the wholesale market, there is no minimum price at which the IPP will stop selling solar 
electricity since its marginal costs are $0.00/kWh.  A solar generator in this model behaves more 
like a coal plant than a SCGT.  Furthermore, a solar operator should not enter into forward 
delivery contracts because it cannot guarantee delivery at a certain date and time.  Without this 




Many operators of solar generators, however, have locked into long term PPAs, the details of 
which are discussed later on in the paper.  
Cost is not the only consideration when evaluating a generation technology.  The sensitivity of 
the electricity grid means that the timing of when electricity comes online is also very important.  
Certain fossil fuel generators such as SCGTs are versatile and can respond quickly to the 
demands of the grid, supplying more electricity when it is needed and cutting back when demand 
drops.  The production of solar generators is hard to control as it and it depends on whether the 
sun is shining or not.  Because of these traits, solar power does not fit in any of the traditional 
models.  It is does not serve base-, intermediate-, nor peak load functions; it is in its own class.   
Valuing solar power 
 
In a completely free market, the value of a good or commodity is determined by the market.  The 
arguments laid out in this section conclude that solar power is worth the spot price of electricity 
on the wholesale market at the point it is generated.  The value of electricity depends on what 
kind of load it can serve or what kind of generation it can replace.  Using the general rule of 
thumb, the value of electricity in ascending order is base-load, intermediate-load, and peak-load 
power.  During periods where only base-load is required, ample generation supply is available.  It 
makes sense that the lowest cost producers are used to provide that electricity.  Peak power is 
normally priced higher than base-load power due to higher electricity demand, less available 
generation capacity, and higher production costs.  Many solar analysts value solar power as peak 
power (Bradford, 2006; Hard Assets Investor, 2008).  If solar generation technologies can replace 
traditional peak power generation sources solar power will have a high value.  This section argues 
that solar power should not be valued as a peak generator.   
Demand for electricity changes depending on the time of day and season of the year.  The load 
can usually be balanced by base and intermediate load generators for the majority of the year.  
Peak load is not experienced often and generally occurs more frequently during the warmer 
summer months.  For example, the load profile in August varies between 1,600 MW and 2,400 




Figure 13.  August Load Profile by Fuel Type, Austin, TX 
 
Austin Energy, 2008. Resource guide: planning for Austin’s future energy resources.  Report, 
October.  
 
If peak demand is arbitrarily defined as above 85 percent of the maximum annual load, the two 
sources of energy responsible for providing power over 2,000 MW demand are purchased power 
and a SCGT.  Peak demand occurs roughly from noon until shortly before midnight, with the 




Figure 14.  Monthly Output of Solar Power from Photovoltaics, Austin, TX.  
 
  
Austin Energy, 2008. Resource guide: planning for Austin’s future energy resources.  Report, 
October.  
 
Compared to the electric load, the generation profile of a PV array located in Austin is does not 
follow the demand for electricity.  Solar PV cells begin to produce electricity at sunrise, say at 
7:30 AM just as demand begins to ramp up for the day.  Peak production from the array in August 
comes at about 1:30 PM.  By 5:00 PM when Austin Energy reaches its peak load, production 
from the array has already dropped to about 50 percent of its rated output.  By 7:30 PM, the solar 
generator has stopped producing electricity while demand still exceeds 90 percent of peak load 
(see Figure 14).  Solar generators operate when the sun is available, nearly every day of the year.  
Solar power can displace valuable peak generation in the summer.  During the spring, fall, and 
winter, however, the power it produces has the value of intermediate or base load.  Over the 
course of a year, the average price of electricity received by solar producers would probably be 
close to the average spot market price.  SCGTs have similar capacity factors to solar generators.  
SCGTs can always receive premium pricing.  These generators probably do not operate for 2.4 




electricity is cheap during the fall and spring, but operate for many hours during the summer to 
capitalize on higher electricity prices.  Solar analysts should not compare the cost of solar power 
to the cost of peak power simply because it is the highest cost electricity.  Peak generators 
provide a value that warrants its high production costs.  Solar generators at the moment cannot 
provide that value.  The ability to store energy, however, would give solar power the ability to 
control when its electricity is released onto the grid and command a premium price.   
The average wholesale prices in 3 of the most expensive markets (the ERCOT in Texas, SP 15 in 
California, and NEPOOL in New England) was $29.12-$109.64 in the 2001-2008 period (EIA, 
2009).  Every so often there are anomalous periods when peak electricity prices reach into the 





Figure 15. Distribution of SP 15 California whole market prices (2001-2009) 
 
EIA, 2009. Wholesale market data.  Report, U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 22. 
Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/wholesale/wholesale.html.   
 
The SP 15 wholesale price exceeded $250/MWh 17 times in the 2001-2008 period.  Wholesale 
market price exceeded $200/MWh 47 times in 2001 alone, with the remaining 28 times in the 
subsequent years.  Unsubsidized solar generators have levelized costs of $234-584/MWh.  In 
other words, based on cost alone solar generators would have been able to sell electricity 
profitably for 39 days in the last 8 years (2922 days).  Electricity is only worth the market price at 
the moment it is produced; the ability to time electricity generation is the key to profitability for a 




Future energy prices 
 
Increasing electricity prices can accelerate the path to grid parity for solar power.  Fuel price 
spikes, volatility in commodity pricing, and environmental concerns have recently increased the 
cost of electricity from fossil fuel generators.  Natural gas prices rose from $6.50/MMBtu to 
$10.50/MMBtu from January to August 2008 (EIA, 2008).  A price forecast that reflects the 




Figure 16.  EIA energy price projections, 2007 dollars 
 
 
EIA, 2009.  Electric power industry: 2007 year in review.  Report, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html#one 
 
In Figure 16 EIA price projections are expressed in constant 2007 dollars.  The cost of coal is 
projected to stay constant for the next 20 years, most likely reflecting the large coal reserves in 
the U.S.  Natural gas costs are projected to increase by a 2.83 percent average until 2030.  All 
costs were then converted to nominal terms assuming a 3 percent annual inflation until 2030 




Figure 17.  EIA energy price projections, nominal dollars. 
 
 
EIA, 2009.  Electric power industry: 2007 year in review.  Report, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html#one 
 
The rate of inflation was chosen through a survey of the historical rate of inflation for the last 5, 
10, 15, and 20 years.  These rates were 3.20, 2.83, 2.70, ad 3.05 percent, respectively (Inflation 
Data, 2009).  Electricity costs rise to $60.47/MMBtu or 20.6¢/kWh, while natural gas prices 
reach $23.37/MMBtu and coal increases to $2.69/MMBtu in 2030.  The projection is that natural 




increase by a nominal 3.5 percent per year until 2030. These cost estimates were intended to be 
aggressive, so as not to underestimate the cost of fossil fuel generation.  Another consideration 
was the increasing cost of building power plants.  High commodity costs such as steel and 
concrete, increasing environmental permitting costs, and construction delays from litigation have 
affected all power plants, especially coal (Schlissel, 2008).  Duke Energy, for example, planned 
to build a two-unit coal fired plant in 2002 at a cost of $2 billion.  Six years later, the cost nearly 
doubled with a new cost estimate of $1.8 billion for a single unit (Schlissel, 2008).  The current 
high-cost construction environment was considered when modeling future generation cost 




Figure 18.  Electricity cost projections (2009 – 2030) 
 
 
EIA, 2009.  Electric power industry: 2007 year in review.  Report, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html#one;  
 
Nemet, G.F., 2006. Beyond the learning curve: factors influencing the cost reduction in 





Table 9.  Marginal cost of electricity production in 2012 and 2030 
Generation source 2012 2030 Difference  
Coal 2 3.4 70% 
Combined-cycle gas 
turbine 
5.8 22.3 284% 
Simple cycle gas turbine 7.2 16.2 125% 
Solar 0 0 0% 
 
EIA, 2009.  Electric power industry: 2007 year in review.  Report, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html#one 
 
The future electricity cost projections were based power plants built today, using current capital 
costs as determined by the EIA (EIA, 2008).  The cost of generation from natural gas fired plants 
will rise faster than generation from coal plants.  The relatively low capacity factors of natural gas 
generators increases the dependence of average electricity rates on the cost of coal generation.  
SCGTs had an average capacity factor of 11.4 percent, CCGTs were 42 percent, and coal 
generators were 74 percent in 2007 (EIA, 2009).  The EIA projection results in an electricity price 
of 20.6¢/kWh in 2030.  The most recent costs projected by the EIA have been updated to reflect 
rising construction and permitting costs for all power plants, especially coal generators.  Coal 
power plants are projected to produce electricity at a cost of 10.7¢/kWh.  Electricity from a 
combined cycle gas turbine operating at a 42 percent capacity factor will cost 22.3¢/kWh.   A 
simple cycle gas turbine will have generation costs of 44.4¢/kWh.   
The solar generation cost projections were based only on PV generation.  The Strategies 
Unlimited learning ratio of 0.17 was used.  An initial module cost of $3.85/W was calculated to 
correct for the inflation from current polysilicon prices.  Module costs were held at a constant 60 
percent of total system costs.  This projection also assumes that no further supply bottlenecks 
arise and that the manufacturing costs follow the experience curve.  The crossover occurs in 2019 
and 2025 for a SCGT and CCGT, respectively, assuming PV penetration grows by 30 percent 




that price forecasts published by the EIA are too optimistic, resulting in unrealistically low retail 
electricity rates (Bradford, 2006).  To avoid this criticism, a separate analysis of California 
electricity prices was performed using historical data.  The forecasting strategy used was to pick a 
time period and inflate electricity prices by a constant rate for that period.  One problem 
encountered was that historical data are extremely varied, thus it is difficult to choose a growth 
rate (see Figure 19 and Table 10).     
Figure 19. Retail electricity prices (2008 dollars) in California (1960-2009) 
 
 





Table 10.  Average annual retail price increase in various California markets 
(%) Residential Commercial Industrial Total 
2004-
2007 
5.5 3.5 2.5 4.1 
2003-
2007 
4.3 0.7 1 2.1 
1990-
2007 
2.2 1.8 1.9 2.2 
 
EIA, 2009. Wholesale market data.  Report, U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 22. 
Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/wholesale/wholesale.html 
 
The decade from 1974-1983 was a period when electricity prices rapidly increased.  The 
inflationary period ended and electricity prices remained relatively stable for almost the following 
20 years.  Electricity prices then rose by between 0.7 to 5.5 percent annually from 2003 to 2007.  
These data can be interpreted in several different ways, depending on the market.  California 
electricity prices experienced periods of stability and periods of rapid price increases.  The 
assumption of the future used in the modeling process discussed before assumes a constant 
growth rate until 2030 to balance the periods of rapid price increases with periods of flat growth.  
Three separate growth rates were used to project future electricity costs to compensate for the 
possibility of data manipulation: aggressively at 5.5 percent, the 3.3 percent projected by the EIA, 




Figure 20. Forecasts of California retail electricity rates and solar electricity costs 
 
 
EIA, 2009.  Electric power industry: 2007 year in review.  Report, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html#one; 
EIA, 2009. Wholesale market data.  Report, U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 22. 
Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/wholesale/wholesale.html 
 
The addition of carbon pricing will make fossil fuel generation more expensive and the crossover 




$10/ton increase in carbon pricing results in coal costs increasing by 1.1¢/kWh, SCGT costs 
increase by 0.6¢/kWh, and CCGT costs increase by 0.4¢/kWh.   
Figure 21.  How carbon pricing schemes affects generation costs 
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The most optimistic projections forecast solar power to become cost competitive with grid-based 
electricity in 2019.  PV capacity will be nearly 200,000 MW at that point with a total investment 
of almost $750 billion.  A more moderate but still aggressive growth rate could result in a delay 
of the crossover to 2022-2031, depending on the rate of electricity price increases.  The crossover 
point of solar electricity and grid-based electricity will most likely not bring on an energy 
revolution from fossil fuel to solar electricity.  The sun is only available 40 percent of the time in 
                                                            





the sunniest locations; without the ability to store excess energy produced during the day for use 
later at night, solar penetration may have difficulty exceeding 15 percent.   
 
The necessity of energy storage  
 
Quads worth of energy were stored by nature in the physical form of fossil fuels.  We humans 
harness the energy stored millions of years ago to power our homes and cars today and generate 
most of today’s electricity.  To generate more electricity, the burn rate is increased, and vice 
versa.  Electricity, however, is like heat.  It must be used at the time of generation, otherwise it is 
lost.  The electricity grid is like a highway; the amount of electricity put onto the grid at point A 
will be delivered to point B.  The grid is not a place where electricity can be stored or regulated.  
The result of delivering less electricity than needed can be a brownout.  Delivering more 
electricity than can be used results in an overvoltage.  Both of these occurrences can damage 
equipment, whether it is a light bulb or expensive manufacturing machinery.  The enormity of the 
grid allows it to handle minor variations in voltage and frequency.  Electrical devices also have 
designed tolerance to operate in a range of voltage and frequency without causing damage.  The 
amount of electricity supplied must therefore match the amount of electricity used at any given 
moment within a given tolerance.   
Electricity also differs from fossil fuels because, unlike coal or oil or gas, it cannot be stored in a 
barrel or container.  The energy storage options available today convert electricity into another 
form such as compressed air or a battery charge, which can then be released and quickly 
converted back into electricity at a different time.  One of the biggest barriers to harnessing the 
energy of the sun is its availability.  The sun only shines 40 percent of the time in the sunniest 
areas of the world.  A world fueled through solar energy requires energy storage options to 
capture excess electricity produced when the sun is available for use at night or on a cloudy day.  
There are only a handful of energy storage options available today – none of which are viable on 




Batteries are commonly used as a storage device PV arrays.  The current technology can be 
applied on the scale of a home, but it is not advanced enough yet for utility scale applications.  
The most recent success demonstrated in battery storage technology was achieved by KEMA.  It 
utilized two trailer sized battery stacks that delivered a total of 500 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 
a span of 15 minutes.  The amount of electricity is not significant; it is about what an average 
American household uses in roughly 17 days (EIA, 2005).  The costs of the experiment were also 
not revealed, but the cost of two trailer sized battery stacks would likely be prohibitively 
expensive for the amount of electricity it is capable of delivering.  Its capability may be adequate 
for short-term load balancing, but the system would provide little value on a cloudy or rainy day, 
for example.   
Storing energy in the form of heat used to create steam and drive a turbine is another possibility 
that is being explored.  Spain-based Gemasolar is building a 17 MW utility-scale demonstration 
plant that will use molten salts as a storage medium (Martin, 2007).  The Solar Tres project will 
be able to store enough energy to generate electricity for up to 15 hours.  The disadvantage of this 
system is that the storage addition does not add versatility to the system; is still non-dispatchable.  
Heat is difficult to store as it eventually dissipates, making it a use-it or lose-it commodity.  If the 
operators know that the fuel source will degrade whether or not the system generates electricity 
the decision will always be to generate electricity as long as the market price for electricity is 
higher than the marginal cost of production.  Solar Tres will be a high capital cost, low marginal 
cost, and non-dispatchable generator putting it in the intermittent/base-load category.  Assuming 
the project performs to specifications and is built on-budget, it is projected to have a high 
capacity factor of 74 percent and a LCOE of 26.7¢/kWh ($267/MWh).  The technology has a 
long way to go before it can compete with other base load generators that produce electricity at a 
cost of less than 5.0¢/kWh.   
One problem faced by solar energy is that grid reliability/load balancing issues will result once 
penetration exceeds 15 percent (Bradford, 2006).  The non-dispatchable nature of solar energy 
means that reserve generation must be available to balance the electric load.  No evidence was 
found suggesting that the industry was developing a roadmap to growing past the 15 percent 




The lack of a viable energy storage solution will become a serious barrier to a future solar 
revolution.  The negative pricing phenomenon of the wind energy industry can be used as a case 
study.  Adding energy storage would allow producers to store the unprofitable electricity to be 
sold on the market when electricity is more valuable, thereby increasing the value of wind power 
significantly.  One reason it has not been added to augment wind energy systems is because it is 
not economically feasible.     
Several energy storage technology used on a utility scale today have been available for decades.  
Compressed air energy storage and pumped storage are two examples, but both have their 
limitations.  CAES requires a fossil fuel input and pumped storage requires certain geographical 
features.  Many other technologies are in development, but far from routine commercial use.  
Hydrogen can be used as a storage medium, but the bulk of hydrogen produced today uses natural 
gas as its feedstock, not water.  One important aspect to recognize is that those who stand to 
benefit most from energy storage are base load generators.  Energy storage would give them the 
ability to store cheap electricity which it can resell for a higher price during peak periods.  The 
probability that energy storage is not deployed on a wide-scale simply because it is not 
economically feasible today must be acknowledged.  It is probably cheaper to install peaking 
units with high production costs instead.   
The solar industry must recognize energy storage as a critical issue to continued development of 
the technology.  It is careless for the industry to simply hope that a viable energy storage solution 
will be available by the time solar energy becomes cost competitive.  Nuclear power was 
commercialized over 50 years ago.  Society today still does not have a solution for nuclear waste.  
The industry needs to take an active role in this development to ensure that its future growth and 






Solar power is a mature technology that is capable of generating and delivering electricity like 
any other generation source available today.  The purpose of this thesis was not to debate the 
merits of solar PV, but rather the economics behind the technology.   
One aspect ignored by this analysis goes beyond the economic benefits of having a solar energy 
system.  People may derive a non-economic utility (happiness) from knowing that their electricity 
was generated by a renewable and pollution-free source.  Austin Energy, for example offers a 
Green Choice program that allows its ratepayers a choice to purchase renewable energy.  There is 
no difference in the quality of electricity delivered.  The only difference observed by the 
ratepayer is in the bill: the Green Choice option is always priced higher than conventional 
electricity at the time it is offered.  Subscribers today pay between $43.50 and $58.50/MWh more 
than ratepayers that have not subscribed to the program.  Despite the additional increase in costs, 
the program is popular as 750 million kWh of AE’s load is subscribed to the program.  These 
Green Choice benefits are the same kind of utility people gain in driving a Lexus instead of a 
Toyota; drinking Poland Spring instead of tap water; or buying Advil instead of generic 
ibuprofen.  The products all perform the same function.  But to the people that cannot afford to 
subscribe to Green Choice, drive an Acura, drink Poland Spring, or buy Advil, the choice is 
straightforward and they are no worse off because of it.   
Solar energy is a luxury product that still has a long road to grid parity.  Rhone Resch, CEO of 
SEIA said in an interview on March 29, 2009 that the cost of solar panels decreased by 20-25 
percent over the last 6 months.  The cost decrease however, was not a result of technological 
improvements, but rather increasing government subsidies.  Without government subsidies, the 
industry would not exist.  The industry receives subsidies in excess of $200/MWh in Austin, TX; 
coal power as a comparison receives subsidies of $36.70/MWh, which include the externality 
costs currently paid by taxpayers.  The RPS implemented by various states is not enough of a 
political mandate to install solar power.  The industry requires a specific solar portion, otherwise 




available today are not optimized to encourage actual research, development, and innovation, but 
represent payments for a quantity of product sold.  The current policies allow otherwise 
unprofitable firms to remain competitive and only inflates the profits of the more efficient firms.  
Subsidy policies should be modified to promote innovation instead of profiteering.   
The current cost of solar power is 24.0 to 58.4¢/kWh, compared to the average utility rate of 
12.8¢/kWh in California.  If the experience curve is to be believed, the most optimistic 
projections have distributed solar generation becoming cost competitive in the California market 
in 2020 after more than $1.1 trillion of investments.  Grid parity will probably not signify a 
changing of the guard from fossil fuel to solar generation.  The sun is only available 40 percent of 
the time in the sunniest locations; without the ability to store excess energy produced during the 
day for use later at night, solar penetration is not likely to exceed 15 percent.  The lack of viable 
storage options for the wind industry has led it to selling its electricity for negative prices during 
certain periods.  With storage, solar energy can ignite an energy revolution once it does become 
cost competitive.  The author was unable to find evidence that the solar industry was applying the 
lessons learned by the wind industry and is not actively developing a storage solution.  Several 
decades ago, nuclear energy became commercially viable; we as a society still have not 
developed a method to safely dispose of those spent fuel rods from the first reactors.  The 
possibility that solar power will always remain as the energy source of the future must be 
considered, especially if this energy storage hurdle cannot be overcome.   
The ability to harness the sun as an unlimited and clean resource is certainly a romantic ideal, but 
has not demonstrated itself to be a viable option yet.  The energy problems that we experience 
today and anticipate for tomorrow has can be mitigated on several fronts.  Using energy more 
efficiently can be an effective way to reduce energy use in the face of higher prices.  Recognize 
that renewable energy can be found almost anywhere.  A handful of examples include mining 
heat from deep beneath the Earth’s surface, thermophotovoltaic cells that utilize infrared (heat) 
waves to generate electricity, or small-scale turbines that can be powered by river currents.  Solar 
energy is not the only solution.  Developing a technology to economically harness solar energy 
would certainly alleviate many of the problems associated with energy today, but there are also 
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